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Crane’s recent The Objects of Thought is a very ambitious book, for it wants to keep together the 
following apparently incompatible claims. On the one hand, there are intentional objects even if they 
do not exist, as phenomenology suggests and philosophers of a Meinongian brand have repeatedly 
stated. On the other hand, reality itself is made just of existent things, as realists of any sort maintain 
against Meinongians and ultrarealists in general (p. 3). 
 In order to show that the above incompatibility is merely apparent, Crane endorses some 
further theses. To begin with, in the first part of the book he defends a negative thesis: pace Quine, 
the truth of (irregimented) existential quantifications is not the mark of ontological commitment. An 
existential quantification concerning nonexistent objects may well be true even if we are not 
ontologically committed to such objects. In actual fact, nonexistent objects are for Crane just 
nonexistent intentional objects. For him, the issue of nonexistence indeed concerns either error, 
which is based on thoughts – sometimes, hallucinatory experiences – directed upon nonexistent 
objects, or fiction, which is based on intentional states of imagination again directed upon 
nonexistent objects, or even mythology, which is something between error and fiction (p. 15). Hence, 
an existential quantification concerning nonexistent intentional objects may again be true even if we 
are not ontologically committed to such objects. From an ontological point of view, the only items 
we have to be committed to are items that exist, as realists maintain. Hence, we are so committed just 
to intentionalia that exist. Yet it remains true that there are nonexistent objects, in particular 
nonexistent intentional objects. As phenomenology suggests, it is really the case that thoughts are 
about objects, independently of whether such objects exist, hence of whether we are ontologically 
committed to them. Both my thought of London and my thought of Sherlock Holmes are about 
objects, even though unlike London, Holmes does not exist, hence we are not ontologically 
committed to him. Thus, it is really the case that there are objects thoughts are about, even if such 
objects do not exist. Truly saying that an intentionale is an object of thought, Crane further remarks 
especially in chap. 4, is just to take phenomenology seriously. From a metaphysical point of view, he 
goes on to say, in its being thought an intentionale is just an object of thought. Put otherwise, its 
being thought does not assign to it any nature whatsoever; if an intentionale has a nature, the 
question of what its nature amounts to is independent of its being thought about. Once again, both 
London and Holmes are intentionalia, insofar as they are what one’s thoughts are respectively about. 
Yet their being objects of one’s thought does not assign any nature to them; rather, their particular, 
and different, natures are determined independently of the fact that they are thought of – London is a 
concrete entity, while Holmes is a fictional character.  
 Here it seems that the original problem merely multiplies. It is not only the case that there are 
intentional objects that do not exist, but it is also the case that, independently of their being thought, 
such objects have a nature, as well as many other features. As we have just seen, among the 
intentionalia that do not exist, there is Holmes. Moreover, independently of its being an intentionale, 
Holmes has a nature; namely, he is a fictional character. Besides, he has many other features as well: 
e.g., he is cleverer than any other detective, real detectives included, he is greatly admired by readers, 
and he is the most famous of Conan Doyle’s literary creations. The same holds true of many other 
nonexistent intentionalia. Vulcan is a theoretical posit, it was postulated by the French astronomer 
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Leverrier in order to explain some astronomical phenomena, yet it does not exist. How can all these 
things be true if we are not ontologically committed to such objects? 
 Here, what in chap. 5 Crane calls psychological reductionism enters the stage. Even though 
all the above things are true, they are true in virtue of real truth-makers, namely facts that are made 
of existing objects, objects we are ontologically committed to. As to the above examples, such real 
truth-makers are representational facts, involving just existing subjects and existing representations. 
That Holmes is very famous is made true by the fact that many subjects mobilize Holmes-
representations; that Vulcan is postulated by Leverrier is made true by the fact that there are certain 
representations by Leverrier in which he mobilized Vulcan’s alleged features. Ultimately, says Crane 
in chap. 6, the last chapter of the book, it is in virtue of the fact that we approximately share such 
representations that all of us can think about the ‘same’ intentional object even if such an object does 
not exist, hence we are not ontologically committed to it (and speaking of ‘sameness’ is therefore 
somehow metaphorical). As he says in chap. 1, for a thought to be about an intentionale is not to 
entertain with it a real relation. Only intentional objects that exist, hence objects to which we are 
ontologically committed, are such that thoughts about them are really related to them, refer to them, 
in Crane’s own wording (p. 9). Rather, for a thought to be about an intentionale basically means to 
have a representational structure in which that thought is endowed with a certain intentional content. 
 I am pretty much in favour of Crane’s metaphysical conception of intentionalia, although, as 
I have argued elsewhere (e.g. Voltolini 2013), I do not think that existence yields the right line of 
divide between intentionalia to which we are ontologically committed and those to which we are not 
so committed. Crane argues that having a certain nature for an intentionale prompts ontological 
commitment to it only if that nature is an existence-entailing one. Although qua objects of thought 
they are on a par, we are ontologically committed to London but not to Holmes, for London’s 
concreteness forces it to exist, while Holmes’ fictionality has no similar import (pp. 62-68). Let me 
postpone for a moment the whole assessment of what kind of property existence really is for Crane. 
Crane’s underlying thought seems to be that existence is the mark of ontological commitment insofar 
as, by being entailed by certain natures but not by others, it is a heavy property: it must be something 
that makes a difference – a causal difference – in the world. As he says, “non-existent objects have 
no causal powers” (p. 66). Yet such a heaviness hardly makes the divide between items we are 
ontologically committed to and items to which we are not so committed. For instance, numbers have 
no causal powers, yet we are ontologically committed to them. For a kind of object to be admitted in 
the overall ontological domain, its indispensability rather seems the right criterion to adopt. Yet such 
an indispensability may well have nothing to do with causality, as numbers – and perhaps fictional 
objects themselves – well show. 
 Independently of this point, I wonder whether Crane successfully defends his thesis that it is 
really true, yet noncommittal, that there are intentionalia that do not exist. To begin with, he has to 
acknowledge that in order for such a thesis to be true, “existence” cannot work as a second-level 
predicate. For, if in saying that there are intentionalia that do not exist, “exist” here meant the same 
as the existential quantifier, one could not but end up uttering a contradiction, namely that there are 
intentional objects that are such that there are no such objects – as Quineans typically object to 
Meinongians, who take that existential claim to be not only true but also ontologically committing to 
nonexistent items. (To be sure, one might take the second occurrence of the quantifier in that dictum 
as restricted to the existents. This would provide a non-contradictory reading of the dictum, yet it 
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would mean endorsing the Meinongian interpretation of it Crane dislikes. See later.) Thus, if Crane 
wishes such a thesis to express a truth, “exist” in it cannot but be a first-level predicate. As a matter 
of fact, Crane himself seems to favor one such reading. As he explicitly says: “I think that Evans, 
Mackie and others are right that we should treat ‘exist’ as a first-level predicate” (p. 34). Yet he 
seems to endorse that reading in the interpretation that Evans himself adopts, according to which the 
first-level property of existence that predicate expresses is a universal property of individuals (ib.). 
Indeed, according to him existence is a (pleonastic: see later) property of individuals that is 
possessed by whatever figures in the overall ontological domain (p. 75). Yet if this interpretation is 
correct, it can hardly be the case that the claim that there are intentionalia that do not exist is true, as 
Crane wishes. For, as he himself acknowledges, given his realist ontological picture what is really 
true is its contradictory. For him, “there are no nonexistent entities” (p. 5), that is, it is not the case 
that there are – in the existentially, or ontologically, relevant import that at least rarely existential 
sentences have, as he admits (p. 45) – entities that do not exist. Hence, it is not the case that – in such 
an import – there are intentional objects that do not exist either: “there is no special category of 
entities or quasi-entities or pseudo-entities called ‘intentional objects’ or ‘nonexistent objects’” (pp. 
4-5). At any rate, moreover, he acknowledges that allowing a first-level reading to “exist” in which it 
expresses a universal property of individuals is not enough in order to rule out the standard, Quinean, 
view that links quantification and existence (p. 34). Thus, in order to save both the truth of the thesis 
that there are intentionalia that do not exist and the claim that “exist” is a first-level predicate, he 
cannot but end up holding that such a predicate expresses a non-universal first-level property. This is 
strongly suggested by the truth of the sentence “some characters in the Bible existed and some did 
not”, which for him has admittedly almost the same syntax as “some kings of England died violently 
and some did not” (p. 17). Yet if this is the case, one can hardly understand how his position may 
differ from the Meinongian one he dislikes. Meinongians precisely hold both that the thesis that there 
are intentionalia that do not exist is true and that “exist” in it is a first-level non-universal predicate. 
Yet they also ‘Quineanly’ maintain that the truth of the above thesis ontologically commits one to 
nonexistent intentionalia. (Incidentally, here one must not be led astray by notational concerns. It is 
true that, as Crane notes (p. 26), a Meinongian such as Priest believes that being is the same as 
existence. This belief indeed leads Priest to further holding that “there are intentionalia that do not 
exist” is false, since this sentence for him means “there exist intentional objects that do not exist”. 
Yet for Priest being, aka existence, is just a non-universal first-level property of individuals, for the 
overall ontological domain is made both of items that have being, aka existence, and of items that fail 
to have it. Hence, there is for him another quantified sentence, namely “Some intentional objects do 
not have being, aka do not exist”, which is indisputably true. Yet pace Crane (pp. 26-7), this sentence 
is for Priest ontologically committal. “Some” expresses for Priest ontological commitment à la 
Meinong, although it does not express existential commitment, if this simply means, commitment to 
the subdomain of items that have being, aka existence. So, Priest’s noneism is definitely not a good 
ally for Crane to appeal to in his defense of true quantified, yet ontologically noncommittal, 
sentences.) 
 Be that as it may, an analogous problem arises as to sentences whose singular terms seem to 
involve nonexistent intentionalia. Consider the examples implicitly quoted above: “Holmes is a 
fictional character”, “Holmes is cleverer than any other detective”, “Holmes is admired”, “Holmes is 
the most famous of Doyle’s literary creations”, “Vulcan is a theoretical posit”, “Vulcan was 
postulated by Leverrier”, and of course “Holmes does not exist” and “Vulcan does not exist”. For 
Crane, “Holmes” and “Vulcan” are non-referring singular terms. Yet, those sentences are true even if 
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we are not ontologically committed to the objects the thoughts underlying such sentences are about. 
A possible way of dealing with this delicate situation is to appeal to a (positive) free logics treatment 
of such sentences, as Crane himself positively considers (p. 57). Yet, he cannot properly endorse 
such a solution. For (positive) free logics rejects the entailment from sentences of the form “Fa” or 
“Rab” such as the above to sentences of the form “x Fx”. However, Crane wants to preserve that 
entailment, at least in the relevant cases. For him any of the above sentences - e.g. “Holmes is a 
fictional character” - legitimates an inference to a corresponding quantified sentence, e.g. “There is a 
fictional character”. As he says, “quantified sentences of the kind [here discussed] … are best 
understood as generalizations from sentences which predicate something of their subjects” (p. 119). 
(To be sure, he admits that from “Leverrier thinks about Vulcan” one cannot validly infer “(x) 
Leverrier is thinking about x”, just as a free logician would say (p. 56). However, it is not clear to me 
how he can admit that. For “Leverrier thinks about Vulcan” means the same as “Vulcan is an 
intentional object for Leverrier”, from which Crane should derive “(x) (x is an intentional object for 
Leverrier)”.) As a matter of fact, Crane seems to look for another solution. According to him, one 
can draw a distinction between pleonastic properties, i.e., properties whose possession amounts to 
being truly predicated of something (pp. 64, 70), and substantial properties, properties “that 
characterize the nature of real existing things” (p. 66). The above sentences mobilize just the first 
kind of properties. Thus, their true predication should involve no ontological commitment to what 
they are predicated of (p. 67). However, appealing to pleonastic properties does not work in this 
context. First of all, the distinction between pleonastic and substantial properties is, in Crane’s own 
lights, orthogonal to the distinction between items one is not ontologically committed to and items 
one is ontologically committed to. As Crane maintains, most pleonastic properties are representation-
dependent properties, that is, they are properties whose true predication depends on the existence of 
some representation that mobilizes a suitable intentional content (p. 68). Yet, as Crane acknowledges 
(p. 69), even genuine entities can have such pleonastic properties. Certain real characters are talked 
about in fiction, Crane says: this is e.g. the case of Napoleon in War and Peace (p. 79). This entails 
that Napoleon is represented in War and Peace in a certain way; thus, he gets certain pleonastic 
properties, e.g. the property of being recalled far less than Countess Natasha in such a novel. Yet, 
this further means that being a pleonastic property is no mark of ontological decommitment. 
Moreover, appealing to pleonastic properties was not originally intended as a means to ontological 
decommitment. The idea of pleonastic entities was introduced in the philosophical literature by 
Schiffer (2003) and then reprised by Thomasson (2003), not in order to dispense with such entities, 
but rather to show how to be ontologically committed to those entities is a deflationary free lunch 
that does not weigh ontology down with metaphysically substantive entities.  
 At this point, in order to save the idea that both quantified sentences and singular sentences 
somehow involving nonexistent intentionalia are both true and ontologically noncommittal, Crane 
might appeal to a traditional strategy, paraphraseism. According to paraphraseism, any such 
sentence is both true and noncommittal for it means the same as another, overtly noncommittal, 
sentence. However, Crane puts this strategy aside (p. 120), probably also because of the well-known 
problem that, at least when non-referring singular terms are involved, no suitable paraphrase keeps 
the same modal content, hence the same truth-conditions, as the original sentence it allegedly 
paraphrases (Kripke 2013). Instead, as I said before, he prefers to appeal to psychological 
reductionism, according to which such sentences are true because their truth depends on more basic 
facts concerning genuine entities that make them true. In particular, such facts are representational 
facts. In order for such a sentence to be true, at least a certain representation having a certain 
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intentional content – typically individuated on the basis of a mental file nesting certain information 
about the relevant nonexistent intentionale (pp. 158-61) – must obtain (p. 133ff). 
 Clearly enough, although this reductionism is not an ontological reductionism, it is not a 
nomological reductionism either: it is not the case that truths about nonexistents have to be deduced 
from some more basic truths. So, perhaps this account provides necessary conditions in order for the 
relevant sentences to be true. Yet it does not provide sufficient conditions. Quite likely, we share the 
intuition that Leverrier and Twin-Leverrier postulated two different nonexistent intentionalia when 
they said that Vulcan is an orbit perturbator. The first astronomer thought about the nonexistent 
Vulcan, the thing that, had it existed, would have perturbated Mercury’s orbit, whereas utterly 
independently of the first, in his own galaxy the second astronomer thought about the different 
nonexistent Twin-Vulcan, the thing that, had it existed, would have perturbated Twin-Mercury’s 
orbit. Nevertheless, they shared the same kind of Vulcan-representations with the very same 
intentional content; witness the fact that if the twins had unknowingly swapped their galactic 
positions, they would have gone on behaving in the very same way. Borges’ Pierre Menard famous 
thought-experiment points towards a similar predicament: Cervantes and Menard respectively 
mobilize two distinct fictional nonexistent Don Quixotes, yet they share the same kind of 
representational facts. Given his both internalist and non-descriptivist approach to intentional content 
that his appeal to mental files displays, Crane has to allow such an unpleasant consequence. 
 Perhaps Crane might reply that such cases merely show that the same kind of representational 
facts make true different sentences. Yet, surely enough, they weaken his idea of “assuming the idea 
of representation … by assuming the idea of an object of thought” (p. 41). For such an assumption 
entails that appealing to different (nonexistent) intentionalia serves to identify different thoughts 
hence different representational structures, as Crane explicitly maintained in his earlier (2001). 
Moreover, the above cases certainly shake his claim that similarity of representations prompts 
‘sameness’ of nonexistent intentionalia (p. 163). For to repeat, in such cases the involved 
representations are clearly similar, yet the nonexistent intentionalia are surely ‘different’. 
 All in all, I wonder whether Crane’s intermediate course between the Scylla of 
Meinongianism and the Charybdis of realism is really viable. There is another path, however, that 
Crane has not yet investigated. Clearly enough, there is a phenomenological sense in which all the 
above sentences are true. Within the scope of what appears to the thinker, it is clearly true both (a) 
that there are certain nonexistent objects of thought, such as e.g. Holmes and Vulcan, and (b) that 
those intentionalia have certain properties, those that are predicated of them in the above singular 
sentences, even though it turns out that we cannot be ontologically committed to them. Thus, Crane 
might say that although it is not really true that there are nonexistent intentionalia etc. (for what is 
really true for him, as we have seen, is that there are no such objects), those things are 
phenomenologically true. Along such lines, he might even say that those phenomenological truths 
also convey real truths (in some pragmatic sense to be better specified). Everett (2013) has 
performed a similar move by saying that sentences of the above kind are fictionally true, so that they 
also convey real truths. To be sure, I am skeptical as to whether Everett’s move is really satisfactory. 
Yet, clearly enough, the two moves, the phenomenological and the fictionalist one, though similar, 
are not identical. For, as Crane acknowledges from the very beginning of his book, some cases of 
nonexistent intentionalia, the ‘error’- cases, involve no fiction at all. So, the phenomenological move 
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may cover cases that the fictionalist move leaves open. Hence, such a phenomenological strategy is 
definitely worth pursuing. 
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